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A Substance-Oriented Approach to the Boot- 
Netting Rules Under Section 1031 of the 
Internal Revenue Code: Biggs v. Commissioner 
Since the enactment of section 1031 of the Internal Revenue 
Code,' courts have struggled to discover a principled rationale 
for applying it.' Contrary to the usual rule in tax law that sub- 
stance prevails over form, the courts initially developed a theory 
of section 1031 in which form prevailed over substance.' This 
theory reached its height in Alderson u. Commissioner' and 
Carl ton v. United  state^.^ Recent decisions, however, have indi- 
cated a shift toward a substance-oriented analysi~.~ In Biggs v. 
1. The term "section 1031" refers not only to the current code but also to its prede- 
cessors, Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 8 203(b)(l), 43 Stat. 253; Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 
852, 5 112(b)(l), 45 Stat. 791; and Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, 5 112(b)(l), 53 Stat. 37. 
For the purposes of this Case Note, the relevant portions of section 1031 are: 
5 1031. Exchange of property held for productive use or investment. 
(a) Nonrecognition of gain or loss from exchanges solely in kind. 
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive use in 
trade or business or for investment (not including stock in trade or other prop- 
erty held primarily for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certifi- 
cates of trust or beneficial interest, or other securities or evidence of indebted- 
ness or interest) is exchanged solely for property of a like kind to be held 
either for productive use in trade or business or for investment. 
(b) Gain from exchanges not solely in kind. 
If an exchange would be within the provisions of subsection (a), of section 
1035(a), of section 1036(a), or of section 1037(a), if it were not for the fact that 
the property received in exchange consists not only of property permitted by 
such provisions to be received without the recognition of gain, but also of other 
property or money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, 
but in an amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market 
value of such other property. 
2. See Smith v. Commissioner, 537 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1976); Bell Lines, Inc. v. 
United States, 480 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1973); Crenshaw v. United States, 450 F.2d 472 
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972); Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 
(5th Cir. 1967); Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); Century Elec. 
Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952); 124 
Front St., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 6 (1975); Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394 
(1969). 
3. Comment, Section 1031 Exchanges: Step Transaction Analysis and the Need for 
Legislative Amendment, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 351, 363 (1976). 
4. 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963). 
5. 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967). For a discussion of this case, see notes 22 through 24 
and accompanying text infra. 
6. Rutland v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 40 (1977); Coupe v. Commissioner, 
52 T.C. 394 (1969); Duhl, Like-Kind Exchanges Under Section 1031: Multiparty Ex- 
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Commissioner,' the Tax Court took a major step in that direc- 
tion. The two principal issues in Biggs were whether a valid ex- 
change under section 1031 had occurred and whether boot re- 
ceived in the form of cash can be netted with boot given in the 
form of debt assumption. The Tax Court decided affirmatively 
on both questions. In late 1980, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
Tax Court's decision.' The first issue is the main subject of both 
opinions. The second issue received only cursory treatment in 
the Tax Court opinion and is not mentioned in the Fifth Circuit 
opinion. Nonetheless, the second issue is perhaps the more im- 
portant of the two and is the subject of this Case Note.@ 
In 1968, Franklin Biggs owned two parcels of land in Mary- 
land.1° Hoping to dispose of the property in a partially tax-free 
exchange under section 1031, Biggs sought and found a pur- 
chaser, Shepard Powell, who was willing to help effect such an 
exchange.ll Through a realtor, Biggs located four suitable ex- 
change properties in Virginia. Biggs then arranged for Shore Ti- 
tle, Inc., (Shore) to buy the Virginia properties for $272,1001a - 
Shore assuming an existing debt of $142,544.86 and Biggs essen- 
tially loaning Shore the balance due of $129,555.14.lS On Febru- 
changes, Nonsimultaneous Exchanges and Exchanges of Partnership Interests, 58 
TAXES 949, 954-957 (1980). 
7. 69 T.C. 905 (1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980). 
8. 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980). 
9. Since the exchange issue and its components have already been treated elsewhere, 
this Case Note will focus on the boot-netting issue. See Duhl, supra note 6; Price, Ex- 
changing Like-Kind Property Under Section 1031, 56 Tmuss 594 (1978). 
10. 632 F.2d at 1172. 
11. Id. at 1172-73. Biggs originally listed his property for sale with a realtor, who 
introduced him to Powell. Biggs and Powell signed a memorandum of intent in which 
Biggs agreed to sell Powell the Maryland property for $100,000 cash and an $800,000 
note. Id. 
12. Id. at 1173. Shore Title, Inc., was a Maryland corporation owned and controlled 
by Biggs' attorney, W. Edgar Porter, and Porter's family. Id. This raises interesting 
agency questions which will not be pursued here. See 124 Front St., Inc. v. Commis- 
sioner, 65 T.C. 6 (1975); Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394 (1969); Price, supra note 9, 
at 598-99. Upon finding the property, Biggs executed a contract to buy the property in 
his own name, although this was later changed to list him as "agent for syndicate." Pre- 
sumably the "syndicate" was to be Powell, but Powell was unwilling to actually talre 
title. Therefore, Biggs assigned the contract to Shore and arranged for Shore to take 
title. 
13. 632 F.2d at 1174. Upon signing the contract to buy the Virginia property, Biggs 
put down a deposit of $13,900. Id. at 1173. This has been added to the balance due at 
closing of $115,655.14 in order to simplify the facts because it is essentially an amount 
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ary 26, 1969, Powell signed a contract to buy the Virginia 
properties from Shore. Powell agreed to assume the $142,544.86 
previously assumed by Shore as well as the debt Shore owed to 
Biggs, resulting in a total debt of $272,100.14 The next day, Biggs 
and Powell executed a contract providing that Biggs would con- 
vey the Maryland property to Powell. In return, Powell would 
pay Biggs $100,000 in cash, issue him an $800,000 installment 
note, and assign Biggs his rights to purchase the Virginia prop- 
erty subject to the debts? The fair market value of the Mary- 
land property was $900,000, and that of the Virginia property, 
$272,100.16 
Biggs contended that a valid tax-free exchange under sec- 
tion 1031 was accomplished. The Commissioner disagreed and 
assessed a deficiency. Because the basis of the Maryland prop- 
erty was $186,312.80, the Commissioner asserted that the entire 
realized gain of $718,687.29 should be recognized.17 The Corn- 
missioner advanced three arguments in support of his position 
that the transaction was not a valid 1031 exchange. The Tax 
Court found all three arguments unpersuasive. First, the Corn- 
missioner insisted that for an exchange to take place, the two 
transfers must be contractually interdependent, meaning that 
neither party is obligated to transfer his property unless the 
other one also transfers his property? Noting that Powell's con- 
tract to buy the Virginia property was assigned to Biggs as part 
of the consideration for the Maryland property, the court found 
that the transfers were part of an integrated plan to exchange 
property? The court held that although the transfers were not 
contractually interdependent, the fact that they were part of an 
integrated plan was sufficient to qualify under section 1031."O 
owed by Shore to Biggs. 
14. Id. at  1174. Powell also paid an additional $100 to Shore as consideration for the 
assignment of the contract to buy the Virginia property. 
15. Id. at 1174-75. At the closing, Powell assigned his rights under the contract to 
Samuel and Maurice Lessans who in turn assigned their interest to a corporation, Ocean 
View. Ocean View, in turn, issued an $800,000 note directly to Biggs and other notes to 
the Lessans. 
16. Id. at  1173; 69 T.C. at  908. 
17. 69 T.C. at 912. 
18. Id. at 914. 
19. Id. at  914-15 (citing Bell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 480 F.2d 710, 713-14 (4th 
Cir. 1973)); see Crenshaw v. United States, 450 F.2d 472, 475-76 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 658 (5th 
Cir. 1968); Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1951). 
20. 69 T.C. at  914-16. 
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Second, the Commissioner argued that Powell's failure to take 
title to the Virginia property prevented the finding of an ex- 
change. The court held that Powell was not required to take title 
in order to effect a valid exchange." Third, the Commissioner 
argued that the Tax Court was obliged to follow the Fifth Cir- 
cuit decision in Carlton u. United States22 and that the transac- 
tion should therefore be characterized as a sale rather than an 
ex~liange.'~ In Carlton the taxpayer exchanged his property for 
a contract to buy different property and cash equal to the fair 
market value of the property exchanged. The contract did not 
close until two days later, when the taxpayer paid the contract 
price and received a deed. The court distinguished Carlton on 
the basis that in substance, the taxpayer in Carlton sold his 
property, received the cash, and enjoyed unfettered use of the 
money until it was reinvested two days later." 
Based on the foregoing, the Tax Court ruled that the trans- 
action qualified under section 1031 as a tax-free exchange on the 
ground that the substance of the transaction was that of an ex- 
change and not that of a sale.26 
It is not clear from the opinion whether Biggs or the Com- 
missioner addressed the "boot-netting" issue of whether Biggs 
could net the amount of cash received, $900,000, with the 
amount of debts assumed, $272,100, in order to produce a figure 
of $627,900 of boot and hence recognized gain." The court, how- 
ever, implicitly resolved the issue. In addressing the boot issue, 
the court said: 
Although the petitioner received $900,000 when the exchange 
agreement was closed ($100,000 in cash and an $800,000 prom- 
issory note), $129,555.14 of such amount in fact represented re- 
payment of loans previously made by the petitioner to 
Shore. . . . In addition, the Virginia property . . . was subject 
to mortgages in the total amount of $142,544.86, which the pe- 
titioner assumed; thus, part of the cash he received at the clos- 
ing was to reimburse him for the assumption of such mort- 
21. Id. at 916-18. 
22. 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967). 
23. Id. at 918-19. In Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), aff'd on an- 
other issue, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971), the Tax Court 
announced the rule that it would follow the precedent of the circuit to which the case 
would be appealable, even if it considered the precedent wrong. 
24. 69 T.C. at 918-19. 
25. Id. at 912, 914, 918. 
26. See Treas. Reg. 5 1.1031(d)-2 (1960). 
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gages. In substance, the petitioner exchanged his Maryland 
property for the Virginia property and $627,900 in cash or its 
eq~ivalent.~' 
Thus, the court seems to have held that Biggs received boot of 
$627,900 and recognized gain in that The Commis- 
sioner appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit. 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the Tax Court.29 
The proceeding focused on whether there had been a valid sec- 
tion 1031 exchange. The Commissioner relied heavily on Carl- 
ton, which the court distinguished on grounds identical to those 
cited by the Tax Court. The court also noted that in contrast to 
the situation in Carlton, Powell was personally obligated on the 
debts on the Virginia property and therefore had assumed the 
burdens of ownership.s0 Furthermore, the money Carlton re- 
ceived in the exchange was not earmarked for the purchase of 
the exchange property. Oddly, the Fifth Circuit and the parties 
apparently ignored the boot-netting issue; neither the court's 
opinion nor the Commissioner's brief discussed the problem. Ap- 
pellee Biggs' brief simply relied on the Tax Court's finding of 
boot in the amount of $627,900.s1 
By implicitly permitting Biggs to net debt assumed against 
cash received for purposes of computing boot, the Tax Court 
and the Fifth Circuit have invalidated one of the boot-netting 
27. 69 T.C. at 916-17 (citation omitted). The court appears to allude to the idea that 
the netting of the $129,555.14 can be rationalized on a different basis than the netting of 
the $142,544.86. The $129,555.14 is actually repayment of money previously put into the 
transaction. That this can properly be netted against the $900,000 was established in 
Commissioner v. North Shore Bus Co., 143 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1944). However, the facts 
still pose the question of whether debts assumed can be netted against cash received for 
purposes of computing boot. If only the $129,555.14 were netted against the $900,000, 
Biggs would have boot of $770,444.86. Since his realized gain was $718,687.29 and gain is 
recognized up to the amount of boot, his recognized gain under this theory would have 
been $718,687.29. Thus, it is clear that the court also allowed Biggs to net the 
$142,544.86 debt that he assumed against the cash and note he received for purposes of 
computing boot. 
28. 69 T.C. at 916-17. Brief for the Appellee at 7, Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 
1171 (5th Cir. 1980). 
29. 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cis. 1980). 
30. Id. at  1177. 
31. Brief for the Appellee at 7, Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
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rules in the  regulation^.^^ Nevertheless, this result is supported 
by the policy underlying section 1031. 
The rules pertaining to boot and the netting of boot are 
contained in section 1031(b) and Treasury Regulations 
1.1031(b)-1 and 1.1031(d)-2. When a taxpayer in a section 1031 
exchange receives some non-like-kind property or cash (promis- 
sory notes are treated. as cashss) in addition to the like-kind 
property, the fair market value of the non-like-kind property 
plus the amount of cash is called "boot."" Any gain realized 
must be recognized up to the amount of the boot." When a tax- 
payer transfers property subject to a debt, the taxpayer is 
deemed to receive boot in the amount of the debt of which he is 
relieved.s6 If both properties are subject to debt, the taxpayer is 
permitted to net the amount of the debt of which he is relieved 
(boot received) with the amount of debt he assumes (boot 
given)." However, the regulations prohibit the taxpayer from 
netting boot received in the form of cash or other property with 
boot given in the form of debt as~urnption.~~ 
In Biggs, the Maryland property was unencumbered and 
had a fair market value of $900,000. The Virginia property was 
subject to debt equal to its fair market value of $272,100. In re- 
turn for the Maryland property, Biggs received $100,000 cash, an 
$800,000 note, and the Virginia property subject to the two 
debts. Under the boot-netting rules, Biggs could not net the cash 
and note he received with the debt he assumed.ss Thus Biggs 
would receive boot of $900,000. The difference between the fair 
market value of the Maryland property, $900,000, and its basis, 
$186,312.80, would result in a realized gain of $713,687.20.40 Be- 
32. It might be argued that the Tax Court did not intend to overrule the boot-net- 
ting regulation, but rather simply made a mistake. This seems very unlikely in view of 
the fact that the theoretical thrust of the opinion is to emphasize substance over form. 
As the analysis of this Case Note demonstrates, to uphold this regulation would violate 
the substance-over-form maxim. On the other hand, application of the maxim produces 
the result the court reached. 
33. This follows from the fact that in a real estate exchange a note is not like-kind 
property and is therefore "other property or money." Treas. Reg. 5 1.1031(b)-1, as 
amended by, T.D. 6935, 32 Fed. Reg. 15,822 (1967). 
69 T.C. at  912. 
Treas. Reg. 5 1.1031(b)-1, as amended by, T.D. 6935,32 Fed. Reg. 15,822 (1967). 
Treas. Reg. 5 1.1031(b)-l(c), as amended by, T.D. 6935, 32 Fed. Reg. 15,822 
Id. 
Treas. Reg. 5 1.1031(d)-2, Example (2) (1960). 
Id. 
69 T.C. at 912. 
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cause realized gain is recognized to the extent of boot, Biggs 
would recognize the entire gain, $713,687. However, the Tax 
Court seems to have held that he received boot of $627,900: the 
$900,000 cash and note less the $272,100 debt assumed.41 Thus, 
without discussing the possible violation of the boot-netting 
rules, the court apparently allowed Biggs to net the cash and 
note received with the debts assumed. 
Despite its violation of the regulation, the result in Biggs is 
sound because it is consistent with the policy underlying section 
1031. The Tax Court discussed this policy in the following 
terms: 
The purpose of section 1031 . . . was to defer recognition of 
gain or loss on transactions in which, although in theory the 
taxpayer may have realized a gain or loss, his economic situa- 
tion is in substance the same after, as it was before, the trans- 
action. Stated otherwise, if the taxpayer's money continues to 
be invested in the same kind of property, gain or loss should 
not be recogni~ed.'~ 
In applying this policy to the facts in Biggs, both the Tax Court 
and the circuit court employed a substance-oriented analysis. 
The Tax Court explained how such analysis helps effectuate the 
purposes of section 1031: 
[Ulndue reliance on the form of these transactions frustrates 
the legislative purpose, that is, to defer recognition of gain or 
loss in instances in which the taxpayer continues his invest- 
ment in property of a like kind. Undue reliance on form also 
produces capricious results; in cases which are not substan- 
tively different, courts are led to reach differing results. On the 
other hand, if we focus instead on the substance of the transac- 
tions, taking into consideration all steps which are part of an 
integrated plan, we reach results which are consonant with the 
legislative purpose and which treat all taxpayers even- 
handedl~.'~ 
In other words, the validity of regulations promulgated 
under section 1031 should be evaluated in terms of whether 
their application to transactions that are the same in substance 
but different in form results in identical tax treatment. The 
three examples set forth below collectively demonstrate that the 
41. Id. at 916-17. 
42. Id. at 913 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)). 
43. Id. at 918. 
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regulation prohibiting the netting of cash boot received with 
debt-assumption boot given cannot withstand such substance- 
oriented scrutiny. 
Exchange #I :  A owns unencumbered property X with a fair 
market value of $1,000,000 and a basis of $100,000. B owns 
property Y with a fair market value of $500,000, a basis of 
$100,000 and an encumbrance of $200,000. B also has $200,000 
cash. Property Y has a net value of $300,000 ($500,000 fair 
market value less $200,000 debt). A and B want to exchange 
their properties under section 1031. Since the net value of 
property X is $1,000,000, B needs an additional $700,000 in or- 
der to complete the exchange. B gives A a note for $700,000 
and the parties exchange the two properties. A has received 
property Y worth $500,000 and a note worth $700,000 and has 
assumed a debt of $200,000. Because under the current regula- 
tions the $200,000 debt cannot be netted against the $700,000 
note, A has boot of $700,000. In contrast, Biggs permits A to 
net the debt against the note, resulting in boot and recognized 
gain of $500,000. 
Exchange #2: Assume the parties begin in the same position as 
in exchange #I. B uses his $200,000 cash to pay off the loan on 
property Y. A and B exchange their properties and B gives A a 
note for $500,000. A has received property Y and a note worth 
$500,000; hence, he has boot and recognized gain of $500,000. 
Subsequent to the exchange, each party borrows $200,000 on 
his own property. In this example, both the regulation and 
Biggs produce the same result: A has boot and recognized gain 
of $500,000. 
Exchange #3: Assume the parties begin in the same position as 
in exchange #l. A takes out a loan of $700,000 on property X, 
thereby reducing its net value to $300,000, the same as prop- 
erty Y. Thereafter, the parties exchange properties. A receives 
boot in the form of debt relief of $700,000 but he also gives 
boot by assuming a $200,000 debt. As in exchange #2, the ap- 
plication of Biggs and the regulations yield the same result: A 
has boot and recognized gain of $500,000. 
The financial position of A at the end of exchange #1 is 
identical to his position at the end of exchanges #2 and #3. The 
same is true of B. A has property Y worth $500,000, subject to a 
debt of $200,000, and cash or a note of $700,000. B has property 
X worth $1,000,000, subject to a debt of $700,000, and $200,000 
cash. In each case A realized a gain of $900,000 and B realized a 
gain of $400,000. 
Under the Biggs analysis, A recognizes a gain of $500,000 in 
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each exchange. However, under the regulations, cash and notes 
received cannot be offset by debt assumed for purposes of com- 
puting boot.44 This produces different tax results in the three 
transactions. In exchange #I, A has boot and recognized gain of 
$700,000, whereas in exchanges #2 and #3 he has boot and rec- 
ognized gain of only $500,000. Because the current regulation ex- 
alts form over substance, it does not reflect good tax policy. Tax- 
payers receive different tax treatment solely because their 
respective transactions, while substantively identical, are cast in 
different form. A's continued investment in real property is the 
same in exchanges #I, #2, and #3. However, because in ex- 
change #1 A is not permitted to net the boot received with the 
boot given, the legislative purpose of section 1031 is frustrated? 
Furthermore, differences in form that are unimportant for tax 
purposes may be significant for business  purpose^.'^ Therefore, 
when variations in form do not require different tax treatment 
to further tax policy, regulations should not discourage such 
variations. 
44. Treas. Reg. 8 1.1031(d)-2 (1960). 
45. The following table shows, for each textually illustrated exchange, A's financial 
position at the end of the exchange, his realized gain, and his recognized gain under 
Biggs and the current regulations. 
EXCHANGE 
Property 
Debt 
Cash and/or Note 
Realized Gain 
Recognized Gain: 
Biggs 
Regulations 
46. For example, the loan on property Y may carry a lower interest rate or have 
other terms which are more favorable than those presently obtainable. In such a case, A 
would want to assume the loan, if possible, rather than have B pay it off, as in exchange 
#2. Furthermore, B may prefer to finance the difference in the property values through 
A instead of through an outside lending institution. This is because A may offer B a 
lower interest rate or other more favorable terms than would otherwise be obtainable. In 
some cases, loans from third parties may be unobtainable. Since A prefers exchange #1 
to #2 and B prefers exchange #1 to #3, the parties' natural choice would be #1 were it 
not for its adverse tax consequences. Thus, none of the alternatives is entirely satisfac- 
tory. Under Biggs, the parties can now enjoy the benefits of exchange #1 without its tax 
problems. 
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The decision in Biggs continues the trend toward a sub- 
stance-oriented analysis of section 1031 like-kind e~changes.'~ 
Under this analysis, exchanges which are the same in substance 
should receive the same tax treatment regardless of differences 
in form. Preventing taxpayers from netting boot received in the 
form of cash or other property with boot given in the form of 
debt assumption treats similarly situated taxpayers differently. 
This violates the substance-over-form maxim and frustrates the 
legislative purpose of section 1031. By striking down this restric- 
tion in the boot-netting rules, Biggs affords taxpayers greater 
flexibility in structuring a section 1031 exchange. 
Gregory Clark Newton 
47. Duhl, supra note 6, at 954-57. 
